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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the economic outcomes of education for wage earners in Pakistan. 
This is done by analysing the relationship between schooling, cognitive skills and ability on the one 
hand, and economic activity, occupation, sectoral choice and earnings, on the other. In Pakistan, an 
important question remains largely unaddressed: what does the coefficient on ‘schooling’ in 
conventional earnings function estimates measure? While human capital theory holds that the 
economic return to an extra year of schooling measures productivity gains acquired through additional 
schooling, the credentialist view argues that it represents a return to acquired qualifications and 
credentials while a third, the signalling hypothesis, suggests that is captures a return to native ability. 
This paper seeks to adjudicate between these theories using data from a unique purpose-designed 
survey of more than 1000 households in Pakistan, collected in 2007. The paper also examines the 
shape of the education-earnings relationship in Pakistan as a way of testing the poverty reducing 
potential of education in Pakistan. 
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Returns to Schooling, Ability and Cognitive Skills in Pakistan 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to investigate economic outcomes of education for wage earners in 
Pakistan. This is done by analysing the relationship between schooling, cognitive skills and ability on 
the one hand, and economic activity, occupation, sectoral choice and earnings, on the other. The 
labour market benefits of education/skills/ability may accrue both by promoting a person’s entry into 
lucrative occupations and, conditional on occupation, by raising earnings. The aim is to ask whether 
one or more of these dimensions of human capital raise earnings within any given occupation and/or 
raise earnings indirectly via facilitating entry into well paying occupations, such as waged work.  
Evidence from numerous studies of economic returns to schooling show a consistent pattern of 
earnings increasing with education. Exactly how schooling generates these economic consequences 
remains something of a mystery (Katz, 1993)1. It is, however, widely accepted that what is learnt is 
equally, if not more, important than the quantity of schooling acquired (see Glewwe 1996; Ishikawa 
and Ryan, 2002). Conventional wisdom would suggest that ‘years of schooling’ are a good proxy for 
productivity gains in standard estimates of earnings functions or other outcomes. However, this 
assumption has been challenged in applied work (see Boissiere, Knight and Sabot, 1980, for seminal 
work on the issue). There is evidence that cognitive skills have economically large effects on 
individual earnings and on national growth. This literature is summarised in Hanushek (2005)2 and in 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2007). A wider body of literature in the US notes the growing importance 
of cognitive skills as determinants of wages (Murnane, Willet and Levy 1995), that better cognitive 
skills are associated with greater success in training and on-the-job performance (Bishop 1991), that 
even high school dropouts’ cognitive skills are rewarded (Tyler 2002), and that numeracy skills are a 
major factor raising the likelihood of full-time employment (Rivera-Batiz, 1992). Currie and Thomas 
(2001) also note high returns to test scores in terms of wages and employment probabilities among 
lower socio-economic-status children in Britain. In developing countries the evidence is equally 
convincing. For instance, Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985) find large earnings returns to literacy 
and numeracy skills of workers in Tanzania and Kenya while Alderman, Behrman, Ross and Sabot 
(1996) and Behrman, Ross and Sabot (2002) also document statistically significant pay-offs for 
cognitive skills in the rural wage labour market in Pakistan using data from the 1980s. In a separate 
                                                          
1 Cited in Ishikawa and Ryan (2002).  
2 Hanushek (2005) cites 3 US studies showing quite consistently that a one standard deviation increase in 
mathematics test performance at the end of high school in the US translates into 12 per cent higher annual 
earnings. Hanushek also cites three studies from the UK and Canada showing strong productivity returns to both 
numeracy and literacy skills. Substantial returns to cognitive skills also hold across the developing countries for 
which studies have been carried out, i.e. in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Morocco, Pakistan and South Africa. 
Hanushek and Zhang (2006) confirm significant economic returns to literacy for 13 countries on which literacy 
data were available.  
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vein, Jolliffe (1998) finds that cognitive skills have a positive effect on total and off-farm income of 
Ghanaian households.     
The key problem lies in identifying what exactly the coefficient on ‘schooling’ in conventional 
earnings functions measures. While human capital theory advocates that the economic return to an 
extra year of schooling measures productivity gains acquired through additional schooling, the 
credentialist view argues that it represents a return to acquired qualifications and credentials while a 
third, (the signalling hypothesis) suggests that it captures a return to native ability. Paucity of data has 
meant that it has not been possible to ask which of these alternative interpretations applies in Pakistan, 
and more generally elsewhere3. This study aims to address this question both within the context of 
occupational attainment and earnings functions. It asks: is it productivity gains, credentialism or 
native ability that raise earnings by facilitating entry into more rewarding occupations, and which of 
these directly raise individual earnings within waged work?  
An answer to this question is important in identifying the value (if any) of acquiring additional 
education, and has implications for education policy. For instance, if education merely serves as a 
signal for higher ability but does not of itself raise worker productivity, then the efficiency rationale 
for public funding of education disappears, even though schooling remains privately profitable as it 
enables individuals to command higher wages through signalling ability. Addressing these concerns is 
a main objectives of this study. 
The paper also examines the shape of the education-earnings relationship in Pakistan.  While it 
has conventionally been assumed that earnings increase with education at a decreasing rate (i.e. the 
relationship is concave), data for Pakistan for the late 1990s suggest that the relationship is convex, 
i.e. that the return to an extra year of education progressively increases with education level. We re-
examine this issue with very recent data to see whether the extent of convexity has been maintained or 
increased over time. The data come from a unique purpose-designed survey of more than 1000 
households. The data were collected in 2006-2007 from nine districts in Punjab and the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) and of Pakistan. As well as containing standard information needed for the 
estimation of earnings functions (years of schooling, work experience and earnings), the data also 
uniquely include measures of individuals’ cognitive skills (scores on tests of literacy and numeracy) 
and of their innate ability (score on Raven’s Progressive Matrices test). We use a sample of urban and 
rural wage earners aged 15-60 and estimate occupational and sectoral attainment functions and 
earnings functions separately for males and females to allow for the vector of coefficients to differ 
across gender. Occupational and sectoral attainment models are estimated using multinomial logits 
(and binary logit in one instance) while earnings functions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
                                                          
3 While Alderman et al.’s (1996) study addresses this question for wage earners in Pakistan, it does so only for 
males in rural areas and the findings are based on data from the 1980s. The authors find large positive returns to 
cognitive skills and no return either to years of schooling or ability. The authors attribute this finding to suggest 
that the rural labour market in Pakistan rewards human capital.  
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(OLS), Instrumental Variables (IV) and household fixed-effects (see Section 2 for details). The 
models include (among the standard vector of variables) measures of years of completed schooling, 
cognitive skills and innate ability. The cognitive skills variables used are further split into ‘basic-order 
skills’ – a dummy variable measuring whether a person is literate or not – and ‘higher order skills’ 
measuring a larger set of literacy skills (more details in Section 3).   
There are several interesting findings. Firstly, the evidence shows that while basic-order skills 
promote women’s entry into lucrative wage occupations (and within them into blue-collar jobs), for 
men a wider cognitive skills-set is required to aid entry into the more rewarding occupations. Much of 
the direct effect of cognitive skills disappears after conditioning on schooling suggesting that the 
effect of cognitive skills operates through schooling attainment. Secondly, there is no direct effect of 
ability in the earnings functions either for men or women. That OLS, IV and household fixed-effect 
estimates also consistently reveal an economic rate of return of about 5 per cent for all wage earners, 
confirm the lack of ‘ability bias’ and there appears to be no evidence of signalling. Thirdly, the 
estimates reflect a direct return to schooling for men (and no return to cognitive skills) while for 
women there is a suggestion of a return to cognitive skills (in the OLS estimates). The data support 
the human capital hypothesis for women and a credentialist hypothesis for men. Finally, while we can 
attribute the return to schooling for men to credentialism, further investigation shows that much of the 
effect of schooling operates through positive behavioural traits possessed by individuals when aged 
15. Thus, a direct return to schooling may not simply reflect credentialism and could be seen to reflect 
a return to non-cognitive traits valued (and hence remunerated) in the labour market. Evidence also 
confirms the profound convexity of education-earnings profiles observed in previous studies in 
Pakistan. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the underlying methodology while Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 reports the main results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
Controls for completed years of schooling, cognitive skills and innate ability are included in both 
multinomial logit models of occupational attainment and in earnings functions as a means of 
adjudicating whether the data from Pakistan support credentialism, screening or the human capital 
hypothesis. The analysis begins by estimating multinomial logit models of occupational attainment. 
All individuals in the labor market are classified into one of 5 occupational categories: out of the 
labour force (OLF), unemployed, self-employed in agriculture, non-agriculture self-employed and 
wage-employees. Unemployed individuals are those who seek employment and are available for it, 
while OLF individuals are those who do not seek employment, such as housewives, students and the 
retired.  
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   The second part of the study extends the standard Mincerian earnings function to discern what 
the coefficient on schooling measures by incorporating measures of cognitive skills and native ability 
as follows:   
LnYi = β0 + β1Si + β2Hi + β3Ai + β4Xi + εi     (1) 
In (1), LnYi is the natural log of earnings
4 of individual i, Si measures years of completed schooling, 
Hi and Ai measure cognitive skills and inherent ability respectively, Xi is a vector of observed 
characteristics of individual i (such as experience and its square) and εi is an individual-specific error 
term. In this specification, β1 reflects a return to credentials or non-cognitive traits such as attitudes 
and interests, β2 measures the return to productivity or cognitive skills, while β3 potentially captures 
the return to native ability. Earnings functions are fitted only on a sample of male and female wage 
earners aged 15-60.  
We start by estimating OLS models of earnings functions to provide some baseline results. OLS 
estimates potentially suffer from two major biases - sample selectivity and endogeneity (omitted 
variable) bias. Sample selectivity bias arises due to estimating the earnings function on separate sub-
samples of workers, each of which may not be a random draw from the population. This violates a 
fundamental assumption of the least squares regression model. While modelling occupational 
outcomes can be a useful exercise in its own right – suggesting the way in which education, skills and 
ability influence people’s decisions to participate in different types of employment – it is also needed 
for the consistent estimation of earnings functions. Modelling participation in different occupations is 
the first step of the Heckman procedure to correct for sample selectivity: probabilities predicted by the 
occupational choice model are used to derive the selectivity term that is used in the earnings function. 
Following Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983), the earnings equations can be corrected for selectivity by 
including the inverse of Mills ratio λi as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation.  
 However, the problem of endogenous sample selection is akin to the problem of endogeneity 
bias. Endogeneity bias arises if workers’ unobserved traits, which are in the error term, are 
systematically correlated both with included independent variables and with the dependent variable 
(earnings). For instance, if worker ability is positively correlated with both education/cognitive skills 
and with earnings then any positive coefficient on education (or cognitive skills) in the earnings 
function may simply reflect the cross-section correlation between ability on the one hand and both 
education/skills and earnings on the other, rather than representing a causal effect from 
education/skills onto earnings.  
One approach to addressing endogeneity bias arising from omitted ‘ability’ is to include variables 
that proxy for ability directly in earnings functions. Several studies adopt this approach by including 
measures of ‘native ability’ scores from tests (such as the Ravens test) in earnings functions. Two of 
the most notable studies are Griliches (1977) and Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985). The only study 
                                                          
4 We use wage rates as they are a better measure of labour productivity since self-employment earnings 
incorporate a return to physical capital.  
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using this procedure in Pakistan we are aware of is by Alderman, Behrman, Ross and Sabot (1996). 
The consensus from these studies is that the direct effect of ability on earnings is small i.e. ‘ability 
bias’ is either small or non-existent. The key criticism of this approach, however, is that test-based 
ability estimates do not successfully measure individuals’ inborn ability and are contaminated by 
schooling and the environment.    
The instrumental Variable (IV) approach provides an alternative solution to the problem of 
endogeneity. This methodology identifies variables (instruments, Wi) that are correlated with 
schooling and cognitive skills (Si and Hi) and uncorrelated with unobserved ability and measurement 
errors. The key challenge, however, lies in finding suitable instruments i.e. Wi which are not part of 
the vector X in equation 1. Social and natural experiments are useful and many studies use 
‘institutional variations’ in schooling due to such factors as proximity to schools, minimum school-
leaving age etc. to instrument for schooling. Card (1995, 1999 and 2001) provides a summary of some 
of the recent studies that use this approach. The consensus from contemporary research on developed 
countries is that IV estimates based on natural experiments are as high as and sometimes almost 20 
percent higher than corresponding OLS estimates (Card, 2001). The evidence from developing 
countries is similar (see Maluccio, 1998 and Duflo, 2001).  
However, natural-experiment-based IV approaches have exacting data demands and an alternative 
is to use non-experimental IVs for endogenous schooling. As children’s schooling outcomes are to a 
large extent driven by family background (FB), variables such as father’s and mother’s education or 
‘distance to school’ are sometimes used (Söderbom et al., 2005 and Trostel et al., 2002 are examples 
of two recent studies using parental education as instruments for schooling). FB variables constitute 
valid instruments if they affect earnings only indirectly through their effect on schooling or cognitive 
skills, i.e. if there is no intergenerational transmission of ability. With this caveat, we use family 
background variables as instruments for schooling and cognitive skills. FB then enters the vector of 
variables which directly influence schooling and cognitive skills5. 
An alternative to the IV technique is to use observations from different individuals within the 
same family to estimate a ‘household fixed effects’ earnings equation. To the extent that unobserved 
traits are shared within the family, their effect will be netted out in a family differenced model. For 
instance, the error term ‘difference in ability between members’ will be zero if it is the case that 
ability is equal among members. While it is unlikely to be the case that unobserved traits are identical 
across family members, it is likely that they are much more similar within a family than across 
families and, as such, family fixed effects estimation reduces endogeneity bias without necessarily 
eliminating it entirely.  
In this study, we adopt all three approaches – the direct ‘ability’ proxy, IV and household fixed-
effects – in a bid to discern the causal impact of skills and schooling on earnings.  
                                                          
5 Alderman et al. (1996) use several school quality indicators as well as parental education to instrument for 
endogenous cognitive skills.  
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3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data for this study come from a purpose-designed household survey administered to 1194 
urban and rural households between November 2006 and March 2007.  Households were selected 
randomly through stratified sampling from 9 districts in two provinces – Punjab and the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) - in Pakistan6. The data were collected under the auspices of the Research 
Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP).  
The survey collected rich information on various individual, family and community-level factors. 
While the roster captured basic demographic, anthropometric, education and labour market status 
information on all resident household members in the sampled households (more than 8000 
individuals), detailed individual-level questionnaires were administered only to those aged between 
15 and 60 years. Some 4907 individual-level questionnaires were filled. These individuals were also 
administered tests of literacy, numeracy, health knowledge, English language and the Ravens 
Progressive Matrices test (to assess innate ability). The first three of these – literacy, numeracy and 
the health knowledge test – were translated into Urdu, the national language. The literacy and 
numeracy instruments were designed to capture ‘basic order’ skills and ‘higher order’ skills. For 
example, the first half of the literacy test consisted of a small passage followed by a few questions 
testing reading comprehension. Only if a person could answer three out of the total of five questions 
correctly in the short test was he/she administered the ‘long literacy test’ which tested more advanced 
reading and comprehension skills. The numeracy test was also designed similarly. Since the objective 
of the Mathematics test was to measure numeracy skills rather than ability to read, the enumerators 
were trained to read out the numeracy test questions to the respondents. While both the short and long 
literacy tests appear to have captured ‘basic order’ and ‘higher order’ literacy well (see Figure 1), the 
short numeracy test unfortunately turned out not to be a good measure of mathematics skills for the 
sample of wage earners. As we are not convinced of the validity of the short numeracy test, we do not 
use the scores from the ‘basic order’ numeracy skills test in any of the regression analyses. The total 
mathematics score (sum of the short and long numeracy tests), measuring ‘higher order skills’ is used 
in some regressions discussed later. The analysis in this paper is restricted to the sub-sample of waged 
workers aged 15-60 for whom we have literacy and numeracy test scores available. 
Test scores non-response was greater for men than for women largely because they were less likely to 
be available at home for the tests at the time of the enumerator’s visit during the survey. While this is 
likely to generate sample selectivity concerns if individuals for whom scores are available are non-
randomly drawn from the population, data limitations prevent us from correcting for any biases that 
may consequently arise.  
                                                          
6 Rahimyar Khan, Khanewal, Sargodha, Kasur, Attock and Chakwal districts were chosen from Punjab while 
Swaat, Charsadda and Haripur were sampled from NWFP. 
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for labour market status by gender. The extent of gender 
asymmetry in the distribution of the labour force is striking. A significant majority of women are not 
economically active - about 70 per cent women are out of the labour force compared to 18 per cent 
men. Among men who participate in the labour force, wage employment absorbs the highest 
proportion (42 per cent). This is true only for 7.5 per cent of women. This implies that our sample of 
wage earners, especially women, is unlikely to be randomly drawn from the adult population. Table 2 
confirms this suspicion – a much larger proportion of waged women (31 per cent) than men has 
completed 12 or more years of education. Given that among all women (aged 15-60), only about 9 per 
cent have completed 12 or more years of education, the sample of wage employees is indeed atypical. 
Thus, women entering waged work have either very low levels of education and enter waged work 
due to necessity or have completed 10 years of education or more (50 per cent) and enter waged work 
because they aspire to do so.  
[Table 1 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
      [Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 summarises some key statistics. Column (a) shows some interesting differences in mean 
years of completed schooling for different labour market categories. While many of these differences 
are unsurprising, several are striking. For instance, there is more than a 2 year difference in mean 
years of schooling between rural and urban regions. The largest gap (of almost 8 years of schooling) 
is between white-collar and elementary workers. The second largest gap is between government and 
private school graduates. Columns (b) and (c) show the proportions of individuals who are literate or 
numerate (LITERATE was defined as a dummy variable equalling 1 if an individual scored 1 or more, 
i.e. up to 5 in the short literacy test and 0 otherwise7. A person is defined to be numerate if they scored 
at least 3 out of 5 in the short mathematics test and 0 otherwise) in the various categories. There 
appears to be little variation in NUMERATE which suggests that, at least among the sample of wage 
earners, the short numeracy test was not able to distinguish between numerate and non-numerate 
individuals. Column (e) reports mean earnings (Rupees. per month). Consistent with evidence 
elsewhere, the earnings gap between males and females is large and significant. While we expected 
larger differences in wage earnings of rural and urban employees, the insignificantly small difference 
can be explained by the relatively large proportion (25 per cent) of individuals employed in the 
government sector in rural regions. 
 
                                                          
7
 While a person was defined to be LITERATE and, hence, assumed to possess ‘basic order literacy skills’, if 
they scored 1 or more in the short literacy test, simple cross-tabulations revealed that for 35 individuals (33 men 
and 2 women) LITERATE equalled zero (i.e. they were deemed illiterate) despite having completed 5 years of 
education or more. Further investigation revealed that for all 35 individuals a language other than Urdu was 
spoken at home. Our tests, however, were administered in Urdu. Therefore, these people’s inability to 
comprehend the literacy test possibly captured their inability to comprehend the passage in Urdu rather than 
reflecting their literacy status. Hence, for these 35 persons, LITERATE was replaced to equal 1.       
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Occupational Attainment 
 This sub-section investigates whether one of the ways in which the labour market benefits of 
human capital accrue is via promoting entry into more lucrative occupations and deterring entry into 
less-rewarding ones. While a recent paper by Kingdon and Söderbom (2007) investigates this 
question for Pakistan, our paper differs from theirs in a number of ways. Unlike their study which 
uses data from 1999, ours uses latest data from 2007. Also, while their dataset has the advantage of 
being representative of all provinces from Pakistan (ours is from the Punjab and NWFP), the richness 
of the RECOUP dataset allows us to go beyond what they have achieved. For instance, Kingdon and 
Söderbom’s measures of cognitive skills are based on self reports of ‘whether an individual can read 
or write in any language’ (equals 1 if literate) and ‘whether person can do simple sums’ (equals 1 if 
numerate). Our rich data allow us to look not just at the impact of education and cognitive skills but 
also of innate ability. Moreover, our cognitive skills measures are based on actual tests of literacy and 
numeracy rather than on self-reports8. Also, the instruments were devised as short and long tests so as 
to capture basic ability to read and do maths (‘basic order skills’) and advanced reading 
comprehension and mathematics skills (‘higher order skills’). Finally, our rich data allow us to 
investigate the impact of the various dimensions of human capital not just on broad occupational 
outcome (out of the labour force (OLF), unemployed, agriculturally self employed, non-agriculturally 
self employed and waged workers) but also allows division of waged workers into those in the 
government or private sectors and those employed either in elementary occupations, blue-collar work 
or white-collar jobs.   
 Table 4A reports marginal effects from multinomial logit models estimated on activity status 
(in the first category) controlling for basic-order literacy (LITERATE) and the ravens score (among 
the standard controls reported in the table). Table 4B additionally controls for schooling (in 
quadratics). Focus first on the findings in Table 4A which show the direct effects of literacy and 
innate ability without conditioning on years of schooling9. The estimated vector of coefficients varies 
greatly by gender. While being literate clearly promotes women’s entry into the more lucrative wage 
employment sector and reduces the likelihood of being in less-rewarding agricultural self-
employment, possessing basic order skills reduces men’s likelihood of being in wage or agricultural 
employment and increases chances of being OLF or unemployed10. Marginal effects on the ravens 
                                                          
8 Figure 2 illustrates that while cognitive skills are clearly correlated with schooling – individuals perform better 
on these tests with higher levels of completed schooling – the ravens score is fairly invariant to schooling. The 
latter finding gives some credence to the requirement that our measure of ‘ability’ does not depend entirely on 
schooling.  
9 We show the direct effect of literacy/ability without conditioning on schooling because these dimensions of 
human capital are highly correlated.   
10 It seems surprising that those who possess basic literacy (which includes individuals with higher order literacy 
skills) have higher chances of being OLF.  But the fact that possession of higher order literacy skills does not 
increase chances of being OLF (Table 5A) suggests that the positive relationship between basic literacy and 
being OLF in Table 4A is due to the greater influence of individuals who have only the basic literacy skills. 
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score suggest that more able men (i.e. with higher scores on the test) are more likely to be in non-
agricultural self employment and less likely to be in agriculture. Among women, the more able are 
less likely to be out of the labour force and in waged work and also more likely to be unemployed 
(possibly because they willingly wait for better job opportunities).   
[Table 4A about here] 
 As suspected, conditioning on schooling in Table 4B causes much of the direct effect of 
LITERATE to disappear (except by continuing to increase men’s likelihood of being out of the labour 
force and reducing both men and  women’s chances of employment in the less well-paying 
agricultural sector). Among men, there is a convex relationship between years of schooling and the 
probability of being in wage employment: as also seen clearly in Figure 3, the chances of being wage 
employed first fall with education and then rise with education beyond 6 years of schooling. Thus, 
there is a threshold effect: low levels of schooling do not permit men to join wage employment but 
beyond 6 years, their probability of joining waged work increases rapidly at an increasing rate.  The 
effect of schooling increases at a decreasing rate for men in non-agricultural self employment and the 
turning point occurs at about 6.6 years of education. Among women, greater schooling increases the 
chances of being in wage employment (the coefficient on schooling is almost significant at the 10 per 
cent level). Importantly, it is only after women have acquired 7 years of schooling or more that their 
probability of being out of the labour force sharply declines. Given that only 29 per cent women have 
completed 7 years of education or more suggests that a relatively small proportion of women can 
accrue the labour market benefits of schooling. These findings are graphically depicted in Figures 3 
and 4.       
[Table 4B about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 The aforementioned findings are not inconsistent with those reported in Kingdon and 
Söderbom (2007) and in Aslam, Kingdon and Söderbom (2007). The key difference in this study, 
however, is the availability of what we term ‘higher order skills’ i.e. individual’s total scores in 
literacy and mathematics which were not available in these recent studies. Occupational attainment 
may depend not just on whether the individual is literate but also on how strong literacy and numeracy 
skills are. Tables 5A and 5B report the marginal effects from multinomial logit models conditioning 
on higher order skills and the ravens score and on these and schooling, respectively.  
[Table 5A about here] 
Focus first on table 5A. There are several interesting findings. First, higher order literacy and 
numeracy skills clearly improve men’s chances of being in lucrative waged work. The positive effects 
of higher literacy and numeracy skills operate after men score about 3.7 points on the literacy and 4.8 
points on the numeracy tests. This is true for about 46 per cent and 59 per cent men in the sample. For 
women, on the other hand, the direct effect of higher order skills only just works in reducing the 
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likelihood of being unemployed (achieving 5.6 points or more in the mathematics test reduces 
likelihood of being unemployed). However, as only 15 per cent women achieve 6 points or more in 
the numeracy tests, this positive effect affects a relatively small proportion of women.  
Table 5B conditions on schooling (in quadratics). The direct effect of higher order skills 
disappears after conditioning on schooling for men though for women, we note that for any given 
number of years of education, the higher the literacy skills, the greater the chances of being in non-
agricultural self-employment. 
[Table 5B about here] 
 Summarising, the findings from Tables 4 and 5 suggest that while possessing basic order 
skills improves women’s chances of being wage employed, men’s labour market choices are 
determined more by a fuller set of cognitive skills. Part of the explanation for this finding is the 
relative scarcity of well-skilled women compared to men. Alternatively, it could be that within these 
broadly defined labour market categories, the types of occupations and jobs done by men and women 
differ in the requirement of skills – i.e. women are employed in jobs that require possessing mostly 
basic skills while men’s occupational choices require them to hold a superior skills set. For instance, 
among ‘literate’ women, a majority (86 per cent) are concentrated in the following two categories: life 
science and health associate professionals (midwives and nurses etc.) and teaching associate 
professionals (primary or pre-primary education). Just ‘literate’ men, on the other hand, are fairly 
evenly distributed across the occupational spectrum.    
The impact of ‘literacy’ on occupational and sectoral choice among the wage employed is 
partly investigated in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 reports the marginal effects from a logit estimate of 
whether a waged worker is employed in the government sector (equals 1) or the private sector (equals 
0). Years of schooling and the possession of higher order numeracy skills cause men to be more likely 
to get government as opposed to private sector jobs. Table 7 reports marginal effects from a 
multinomial logit on occupational choices (elementary, blue-collar and white-collar jobs) estimated 
for waged workers. ‘Elementary’ corresponds to unskilled, ‘blue collar’ to semi-skilled and ‘white-
collar’ to skilled jobs. Clearly, among this classification of waged workers, maths skills promote 
women’s entry into blue-collar jobs. Surprisingly, neither schooling nor cognitive skills appear to 
affect waged men’s occupational attainment as between elementary, blue-collar and white sector jobs. 
However, when the extent of male joblessness is as high as it is in Pakistan – according to Table 1 
nearly 23% of men are either unemployed or OLF (which is disguised unemployment among prime 
age men) – then perhaps even educated men with good cognitive skills cannot be choosy as between 
the type of waged job they will accept. 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
4.2 Earnings Functions 
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This sub-section discusses the findings from estimates of semi-logarithmic earnings functions. 
Table 8 showcases standard Mincerian earnings equations controlling only for years of completed 
schooling and labour market experience for the pooled sample (men and women) and separately for 
the two genders. The first column shows the linear while the second the quadratic specification 
respectively. The large unconditional earnings premium observed for men in the raw descriptive 
statistics in Table 3 is reflected in an even larger conditional premium in Table 8. While the economic 
rate of return to schooling (for each additional year acquired) is about 5 per cent for both men and 
women, consistent with past evidence from Pakistan, the economic return to women’s schooling is 
almost double that for men - 8.3 per cent for the former compared to 4.5 per cent for the latter (see 
Aslam, 2007, Kingdon and Söderbom, 2007 and Riboud, Savchenko, and Tan, 2006 for some recent 
studies in Pakistan reporting higher labour market returns to women’s schooling than men’s). Finally, 
in this basic specification, while the relationship between schooling and earnings is quadratic for men, 
it appears to be linear for the sub-sample of women. Interestingly, inclusion of the ravens test score in 
the specifications reported above doesn’t alter any of the aforementioned results, unsurprising given 
the insignificance of innate ability in the earnings functions specifications (see Appendix A1). This 
finding suggests that the coefficient on schooling doesn’t appear to capture a return to native ability. 
Parsimonious specifications from this point onwards do not include the ravens score in earnings 
function estimates.  
[Table 8 about here] 
 Table 9 reports earnings functions estimates incorporating a measure of basic-order literacy 
skills (as mentioned before, we do not include any measures for basic-order numeracy skills). 
LITERATE is insignificant in both the linear and quadratic specifications for men. For women, it is 
positive and precisely determined in the quadratic specification.  
A comparison between column (3) in Table 8 and column (3) in Table 9 shows that for men, the 
coefficient on schooling remains significant and doesn’t change substantially when direct measures of 
cognitive skills are introduced. This holds for the quadratic specification as well. A comparison for 
females (column 5 in Table 8 with column 3 in Table 9) reveals that the inclusion of cognitive skills 
measures causes the coefficient on schooling to fall to zero (from 0.083) suggesting that schooling 
contributes for women directly through cognitive skills acquisition though the effect is small and not 
significant. This finding does change in the quadratic specification – both coefficients on schooling 
and LITERATE are significant signifying that both contribute towards women’s earnings11. There are 
two possible interpretations of the result for men: firstly that schooling attainment directly makes a 
                                                          
11 Alternatively, earnings functions were estimated with basic-order literacy skills measured in the form of 5 
dummy variables – DUMLIT1, DUMLIT2, DUMLIT3, DUMLIT4 and DUMLIT5. DUMLIT1 equals 1 if an 
individual scored 1 in the short literacy test and 0 otherwise, DUMLIT2 equals 1 if an individual scored 2 in the 
short literacy test etc. The objective was to determine whether the effect of possessing better basic-order literacy 
skills was any different from lesser ability to read (measured through a smaller score). The findings are reported 
in Appendix A2. Clearly, the coefficients on the 5 literacy dummy variables are mostly not significantly 
different from each other implying that one can collapse basic-order literacy into LITERATE.     
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contribution to earnings over and above any arising from cognitive skills acquisition (i.e. there is an 
element of credentialism for waged men), and secondly that the cognitive skills variables does not 
adequately measure cognitive skills differences between leavers at each education level so that 
schooling attainment itself is a better proxy for cognitive skills than the LITERATE variable. Which 
interpretation is more plausible?  Since cognitive achievement increases with schooling (Figure 2) and 
LITERATE is a dichotomous variable that is unlikely to capture all aspects of literacy that result from 
schooling, we are somewhat hesitant to conclude that there is credentialism for waged men in 
Pakistan. This reluctance is further strengthened when we consider that cognitive skills scores are 
available only on a sub-sample of waged men, resulting in greater selectivity bias than in the case of 
women.   
 [Table 9 about here] 
 While basic-order cognitive skills captured in the short literacy tests are rewarded in the form 
of higher earnings for women, possession of basic-order literacy skills does not guarantee a return for 
men. Part of the explanation for this differential reflects a scarcity premium – far fewer women are 
literate according to our definition compared to men (59 per cent women compared to about 69 per 
cent men). Our findings also indicate a direct return to schooling for men (linear and quadratic 
specifications) and women (only the quadratic specification). This could reflect credentialism or 
screening or even human capital acquired in school or at home. Moreover, it could even represent a 
return to non-cognitive traits such as social and interpersonal skills and attitudes which may be 
acquired through schooling and valued (and hence remunerated) in the labour market.  
 Table 10 extends the analysis by estimating earnings functions with basic-order skills by 
region. For men, there are direct returns to schooling in both rural and urban regions (columns 1 and 
2). For women, there are large positive returns to schooling in urban areas and no returns in rural 
regions. Importantly, as before, men’s cognitive skills are not directly rewarded in the form of higher 
earnings. While literate women are positively remunerated in rural areas, the coefficient on 
LITERATE is perversely negative in urban regions (though it is not significant in the quadratic 
specification).  
[Table 10 about here] 
 Summarising, the story so far reveals that for men the labour market appears to reward 
schooling attainment. For women, the rewards operate relatively more through basic-order cognitive 
skills rather than through years of completed schooling. Appendix tables A3-A5 extend this work by 
estimating earnings functions incorporating higher order skills (A3) and separately for different 
worker groups and categories in linear and quadratic specifications (A4 and A5 respectively). The 
findings emerging from these tables are that higher-order cognitive skills are not rewarded for either 
gender and that while basic-order skills are rewarded for different classifications of women-workers, 
the results are sensitive to whether schooling is specified as linear or quadratic.  
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4.3 Robustness Checks 
4.3.1 Socialisation Skills and Omitted Variable Bias 
 While the cognitive skills tests used may be quantifying academic learning (albeit 
imperfectly), the labour market may reward non-academic ‘socialisation skills’ (such as discipline, 
networking, planning and leadership ability) equally if not more than academic expertise. These social 
skills may not be fully captured in measures of academic performance. Individuals who attain higher 
education levels, score better in standardised tests and earn more, may be those who at a young age 
have certain personality traits conducive to learning and success in other outcomes. These skills may 
or may not be learnt while at school. For instance, a study by Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) 
in the US finds that 'socialisation skills' are important determinants of labour market outcomes along 
with cognitive skills.  
 The RECOUP dataset includes seven measures of self-reported ‘personality traits’ for 
individuals aged 15-60. Individuals were asked to rank using a rating scale ranging from 1 (very 
inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate), how they believed their personality type was (when aged 15) on the 
following dimensions: making friends easily, finding it difficult to get down to work, having a lot to 
say, making plans and sticking to them, accepting people as they were, being sympathetic to religious 
parties and causes and doing just enough work to get by. We converted these variables into zero-one 
indicator variables and generated an equally weighted index of ‘positive personality traits’ (making 
friends easily, had a lot to say, made plans and stuck to them and accepted people as they were) and 
an index of ‘negative personality traits’ (found it difficult to get to work and did just enough work to 
get by). As individual’s sympathy to religious or other causes could be deemed as a positive or 
negative trait depending on the circumstance, RELIGION (equals 1 if were sympathetic and 0 
otherwise) was kept as a separate indicator variable and not included in either of the two indices12.     
 In Table 11 we examine the relationship between behavioural and personality traits when 
aged 15 and log earnings subsequently for all wage earners. In particular, we regress log earnings on 
personality traits without both schooling attainment and cognitive skills and then with each of these 
and finally condition on both. When we do not condition on schooling and cognitive skills, we find 
positive socialisation/behavioural effects and favourable religious attitudes have a positive effect on 
log earning. For instance, individuals reporting positive personality traits when aged 15 find 
themselves earning up to 6 per cent more than those without such reported characteristics. However, 
these effects disappear completely when conditioning on schooling attainment or basic-order 
cognitive skills (separately or together) suggesting that schooling and positive socialisation skills are 
highly collinear. Thus, rather than having a direct effect on earnings, much of the effect of personality 
traits operates through educational attainment (rather than through cognitive skills) and these findings 
                                                          
12 The proportions reporting ‘1’ among the positive traits were: friends (67%), had lot to say (47%), stuck to 
plans (52%) and accepted people (65%). Proportions reporting ‘1’ in negative traits were: difficult to work 
(52%) and did just enough work (65%). Proportion reporting sympathy for religious/other causes was 42%.  
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imply that while employers reward positive socialisation skills in the form of higher earnings, they 
view these skills as having developed through schooling and the return to higher schooling attainment 
is partly a reward for possessing favourable traits. This suggests that our finding of a direct return to 
schooling may not simply reflect credentialism but could be reflecting a return to non-cognitive traits 
valued (and hence remunerated) in the labour market.  
 
[Table 11 about here] 
4.3.2 Addressing Endogeneity of Schooling and Cognitive Skills 
 The discussion so far has assumed that the coefficients on both schooling and cognitive skills 
are measured consistently and without bias i.e. they measure the causal impact of both on earnings. As 
mentioned in Section 2, one of the greatest challenges facing researchers is the difficulty of attributing 
the impact of either as causal when faced with unobserved traits (the classic ‘ability bias’ problem). 
The coefficients on schooling and cognitive skills can only be interpreted as causal effects if earnings 
differentials between individuals with varying years of schooling/skills do not reflect differences in 
ability or in other unobserved investments in human capital that happen to be correlated with 
education13. 
 As mentioned before, including proxies for ability directly in earnings functions is one way of 
approaching this problem. Much work adopting this approach finds that including a direct measure of 
‘ability’ in earnings functions does not substantially or significantly reduce the coefficient on 
schooling, leading to the conclusion that the direct contribution of ‘ability’ on earnings is small 
(Griliches, 1977). Indeed this is the finding not only from past work on Tanzania and Kenya 
(Boissiere, Knight and Sabot 1985) and Pakistan (Alderman et al. 1996) but also from the current 
study when a measure of the Ravens score is included in earnings functions (see Appendix Table A1). 
Unfortunately, very few datasets contain ability measures that are convincing and, in the present 
study, it cannot be guaranteed that the Ravens score is not reflecting the contribution of schooling or 
the environment.  
 Alternative approaches to addressing the endogeneity problem include using Instrumental 
Variables (IV) or household fixed-effects approaches (discussed in Section 2). The former is based on 
                                                          
13 Due to space constraints, we relegate the selectivity-corrected results (with inverse mills ratios computed 
from the multinomial logits of occupational choice reported in Tables 4A and 4B) to this footnote. We 
replicated Table 9 controlling for selection into waged work and estimated 8 regressions (linear and quadratic 
specifications of the earnings functions for males and females with lambda terms computed from multinomial 
logit models based on specification 1 in Table 4A and specification 2 in Table 4B). In all 8 regressions, lambda 
is negative but significant only in one instance- for males with schooling specified as linear and lambda 
computed from Table 4B (of magnitude -0.518). These findings largely suggest that sample selection is not a 
major concern at least in the data on which this study is based. Two recent studies from Pakistan (Aslam 2007 
and Kingdon and Söderbom 2007) report an upward bias in the baseline OLS estimates of earnings functions on 
wage earners arising from selectivity. This could partly be explained by their larger sample sizes and national 
representativeness (both studies are based on the 1999 and 2001 waves of the nationally representative Pakistan 
Integrated Household Survey covering more than 14000 households from all provinces and regions in Pakistan).      
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finding credible instruments correlated with schooling and cognitive skills but not correlated with the 
residual in the earnings function. The latter approach uses observations from different individuals 
within the same family to ‘difference out’ the variables generating correlation in the residuals (akin to 
the twin-differencing approach).  
 Tables 12A and 12B report OLS and IV earnings functions estimates for all persons and 
separately for males and females. The vector of instruments used to control for the endogeneity of 
schooling attainment and of cognitive skills includes: parental education (fathers and mother’s 
completed years of schooling), distance to primary school in meters (when individual was of primary 
school-going age) and its square, and the individual’s ravens test score. This instruments set appear to 
be ‘valid’. The first stage estimates reported in column (3) in Tables 12A and 12B show that in almost 
all instances, the instruments have large, precisely determined coefficients with expected signs. The 
instruments are also accepted as valid and in no instance does the p-value of Hansen’s over-
identification test reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
 
[Table 12A about here] 
[Table 12 B about here] 
 
 Focus on the findings in Table 12B. For men, there are direct returns to schooling but no 
positive returns to literacy. The marginal rate of return to education (RORE) is about 10%  
using IV. The RORE also doubles when using IV compared to the OLS on the sample on which IV 
was estimated. This finding is consistent with evidence from previous studies and also recently in 
Pakistan (see Aslam 2007)14. The RORE for women also increases when estimated using IV (from 
about 6% to about 7%), but is statistically insignificant in both OLS and IV equations, possibly due to 
the small sample size. There also appears to be no return to literacy for women using either approach. 
While part of the positive coefficient on schooling for men may be attributed to credentialism, Table 
11 above has shown that some of it is a return to non-cognitive skills (behavioural and personality 
traits) rewarded by employers in the labour market.  
 We turn next to household fixed-effects estimates of returns to education. The results are 
based on the sub-sample of households that had at least one male and one female wage-worker who 
are related in any way (father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister, husband-wife etc.)15. While this 
                                                          
14 One explanation for this was proposed by Griliches (1977) who suggested that upward ability bias in the OLS 
estimator is small so that the difference between the OLS and IV estimators reflects correction for attenuation 
bias arising from measurement error in the former estimator. Card (2001) alternatively proposes the potential 
heterogeneity of returns to schooling across individuals in a population as an explanation for why the IV 
estimator is greater compared to the OLS one. However, Card’s explanation applies to instruments based on a 
policy-change or supply-side intervention while this study uses family background and distance to school as 
instruments suggesting that his explanation may not be relevant at least in this case.  
15 From the original sample from which the household fixed-effects sample was derived we deleted observations 
on non-biological children, fathers/mothers-in-law, brothers/sisters-in-law, other relatives and servants, 
17 
 
creates a potential sample selection problem, the procedure allows us to net out unobserved 
heterogeneity in a family differenced model. Although unobserved traits are not identical across 
family members, it is likely they are much more similar within a family than across families and, as 
such, family fixed effects estimation gives an estimate of the return to education that reduces 
endogeneity bias without necessarily eliminating it entirely16.  
 Table 13 presents family fixed-effect findings. As before, the rate of return to an additional 
year of schooling is roughly 5 per cent (compared to about 5.6 per cent using IV in Table 12A and 
compared to about 5.5 per cent using OLS in Table 9). The similarity of the estimated RORE across 
OLS, IV and family fixed effects techniques suggests that ability bias is not strong. Secondly, there 
are direct returns to schooling rather than to human capital which hints at credentialism and (based on 
previous evidence) at rewards to non-cognitive traits such as attitude and behaviour.    
 
[Table 13 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the relationship between dimensions of human capital – years of 
schooling, cognitive skills and ability – on the one hand, and occupational attainment and earnings, on 
the other. The aim was to ask whether one or more of these dimensions of human capital raise 
earnings within any given occupation and/or raise earnings indirectly via facilitating entry into well 
paying occupations. The key objective, therefore, was to ask whether evidence from Pakistan supports 
the human capital, credentialist or signalling hypotheses.   
 There are several interesting findings. Firstly, the evidence shows that while basic-order 
cognitive skills (literacy) promote women’s entry into the lucrative wage occupations, for men higher 
order cognitive skills are required for the same benefit. Much of the direct effect of cognitive skills 
disappears after conditioning on schooling, i.e. skills do not have an independent effect on earnings 
over and above the effect via schooling. Secondly, there is no direct effect of measured ability in the 
earnings functions, either for men or women. That OLS, IV and household fixed-effect estimates 
consistently reveal an economic rate of return of about 5 per cent suggests (in line with much of the 
international literature) that ‘ability bias’ is not strong, and there appears to be no evidence of 
signalling. Thirdly, there is a direct return to schooling for men while for women there is a return to 
cognitive skills, though in IV estimates the effect is not statistically significant possibly due to small 
sample size. The data clearly support the human capital hypothesis for women even on a small 
sample. While they suggest a credentialist hypothesis for men – since skills do not have an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
employees or other non-relatives of the household head reported to be resident in the household. This resulted in 
a loss of 19 individual observations. 
16 We are unable to report fixed-effects estimates separately for males and females due to sample size 
constraints. We also estimated fixed-effects with schooling represented as quadratic but the linear model is 
preferred as schooling and schooling2 are not significant in the quadratic specification. Models were also 
estimated with interaction terms (Schooling*male) and (Literate*Male) to determine gender effects but these too 
were insignificant.  
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independent effect on earnings for men, over and above the effect via schooling – we cannot be 
confident of this conclusion due to the bigger sample selection problem for men (a much higher 
proportion of waged men than women had missing cognitive skills scores). Future studies with better 
data on cognitive skills would need to confirm it for us to be confident of the rather pessimistic 
conclusion of credentialism for Pakistani males in wage employment.    
From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that for waged women, education raises 
earnings and (if workers are paid their marginal product) raises worker productivity, suggesting an 
efficiency rationale for public funding of education. For men there is a less clear story, as there is a 
hint of credentialism.  
Education among both men and women is highly correlated with positive behaviour traits and it 
seems that education also affects earnings/productivity via its effects on these positive traits which are 
rewarded in the labour market. 
The paper also examined the shape of the education-earnings relationship in Pakistan.  While it 
has conventionally been assumed/found that earnings increase with education at a decreasing rate, i.e. 
the relationship is concave (Psacharopoulos, 1994), data for Pakistan for the late 1990s suggested that 
the relationship is convex (Aslam, 2008; Aslam, Kingdon and Soderbom, 2008), i.e. that the return to 
an extra year of education progressively increases with education level. The results from the present 
study also confirm the pronounced convexity of the education-earnings relationship.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
A1: Effect of Ravens on Log Earnings in Earnings Functions – various specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log earnings       
 ALL Male Female 
       
Male 0.577 0.618     
 (6.07)** (6.30)**     
Schooling 0.048 0.013 0.043 0.009 0.076 0.027 
 (7.81)** (0.82) (7.27)** (0.60) (4.60)** (0.49) 
Schooling2  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  (2.30)*  (2.46)**  (0.94) 
Exp 0.078 0.077 0.061 0.059 0.206 0.205 
 (10.45)** (10.30)** (9.28)** (9.04)** (6.21)** (6.10)** 
Exp2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
 (8.48)** (8.47)** (7.39)** (7.29)** (4.87)** (4.75)** 
Ravens 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.004 0.035 0.041 
 (1.02) (0.93) (0.69) (0.44) (1.11) (1.37) 
Constant 6.907 6.940 7.654 7.739 5.949 5.945 
 (49.16)** (49.54)** (84.77)** (84.85)** (16.71)** (16.65)** 
Observations 686 686 559 559 127 127 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.34 0.35 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% or better. 
 
 
 
A2: Effect of Basic-Order Literacy Dummies on Log Earnings,  by Gender   
 
Log earnings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male Female 
Schooling 0.057 0.024 0.072 -0.006 
 (9.92)** (1.72)* (1.76)* (0.07) 
Schooling2  0.002  0.005 
  (2.51)*  (1.08) 
Exp 0.052 0.050 0.199 0.199 
 (8.34)** (8.07)** (5.89)*** (5.83)*** 
Exp2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
 (6.57)** (6.54)** (4.60)** (4.54)** 
Dumlit1 -0.292 -0.266 0.000 0.000 
 (1.87)* (1.74)* (.) (.) 
Dumlit2 -0.131 -0.096 0.487 0.724 
 (1.06) (0.78) (0.98) (1.18) 
Dumlit3 -0.283 -0.239 0.019 0.278 
 (2.34)** (1.90)* (0.03) (0.42) 
Dumlit4 -0.275 -0.238 0.083 0.261 
 (3.41)*** (2.92)*** (0.16) (0.42) 
Dumlit5 -0.203 -0.194 0.222 0.419 
 (3.42)*** (3.27)*** (0.43) (0.69) 
Constant 7.850 7.910 6.224 6.261 
 (141.62)*** (134.18)*** (22.46)*** (22.46)*** 
Observations 836 836 132 132 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.32 0.32 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% or better 
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A3: Effect of Higher-Order Skills on Log Earnings, by Gender   
Log earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male Female 
Schooling 0.060 0.021 0.074 0.003 
 (6.41)*** (1.14) (2.20)** (0.04) 
Schooling2  0.003  0.004 
  (2.28)**  (0.98) 
Exp 0.062 0.060 0.211 0.209 
 (9.33)*** (8.95)**8 (6.34)*** (6.21)*** 
Exp2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
 (7.47)**8 (7.28)*** (4.89)*** (4.76)*** 
Tlit -0.004 0.023 0.172 0.248 
 (0.09) (0.55) (1.10) (1.45) 
Tlit2 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.025 
 (0.22) (0.83) (0.84) (1.27) 
Tmaths -0.035 -0.017 -0.119 -0.090 
 (1.39) (0.64) (0.98) (0.71) 
Tmaths2 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.007 
 (0.90) (0.18) (0.98) (0.73) 
Constant 7.714 7.765 6.155 6.199 
 (123.60)*** (117.38)*** (22.33)*** (22.05)*** 
Observations 559 559 127 127 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.35 0.35 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better 
 
 
Table A4 – Coefficients on Schooling and Skills from Wage Functions, by Worker Group  
Log earnings Male Female 
 Schooling Literate Schooling Literate 
Occupation         
Elementary 0.035 
(2.33) 
*** 0.034 
(0.29) 
 0.014 
(0.35) 
 0.653 
(1.03) 
 
Blue-collar 0.048 
(3.41) 
*** -0.170 
(1.10) 
 -0.123 
(0.55) 
 2.099 
(1.32) 
 
White-collar 0.126 
(4.57) 
*** ---  0.165 
(3.68) 
*** ---  
Region         
Rural 0.056 
(4.99) 
*** -0.121 
(1.16) 
 -0.009 
(1.15) 
 1.182 
(1.79) 
* 
Urban 0.047 
(3.41) 
*** -0.168 
(1.14) 
 0.195 
(4.42) 
*** -1.478 
(2.01) 
** 
Cohort          
Young (<=30) 0.012 
(0.70) 
 -0.094 
(0.65) 
 -0.047 
(0.73) 
 1.564 
(1.89) 
* 
Old (>30) 0.064 
(6.48) 
*** -0.105 
(1.01) 
 0.146 
(3.73) 
*** -0.649 
(1.29) 
 
Empl. Sector         
Private 0.025 
(1.97) 
** 0.018 
(0.18) 
 0.006 
(0.09) 
 0.712 
(0.83) 
 
Govt. 0.075 
(6.16) 
*** -0.366 
(1.84) 
* 0.114 
(3.19) 
*** -0.837 
(-1.92) 
* 
Payment Type         
Regular 0.073 
(7.37) 
*** -0.254 
(2.05) 
** 0.132 
(3.54) 
*** -0.016 
(0.03) 
 
Casual 0.001 
(0.09) 
 0.215 
(1.92) 
* 0.035 
(0.45) 
 1.123 
(1.12) 
 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better. 
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Table A5: Coefficients on Schooling, Schooling2 and Skills from Wage Functions, by Worker Group 
 Male Female 
Log 
earnings 
 
Schooling  Schooling2  Literate  Schooling  Schooling2  Literate  
Occupation             
Elementary -0.014 
(0.42) 
 0.004 
(1.42) 
 0.145 
(1.27) 
 0.048 
(0.61) 
 -0.002 
(0.49) 
 0.568 
(0.79) 
 
Blue-collar 0.052 
(1.57) 
 -0.000 
(0.11) 
 -0.184 
(1.08) 
 -0.276 
(0.95) 
 0.016 
(0.58) 
 2.285 
(1.58) 
 
White-
collar 
0.073 
(0.42) 
 0.002 
(0.30) 
 ---  -0.276 
(0.59) 
 0.017 
(0.96) 
 ---  
Region             
Rural 0.008 
(0.31) 
 0.003 
(1.64) 
 0.036 
(0.34) 
 -0.329 
(2.38) 
** 0.016 
(2.37) 
** 2.604 
(3.33) 
*** 
Urban -0.038 
(0.99) 
 0.005 
(2.42) 
** 0.108 
(0.58) 
 0.272 
(1.09) 
 -0.003 
(0.30) 
 -1.900 
(1.37) 
 
Cohort 
(<=30, >30) 
            
Young -0.025 
(0.63) 
 0.002 
(0.84) 
 0.010 
(0.07) 
 -0.805 
(3.08) 
*** 0.038 
(2.96) 
** 4.385 
(4.08) 
*** 
Old 0.012 
(0.48) 
 0.003 
(2.02) 
** 0.081 
(0.68) 
 0.050 
(0.36) 
 0.004 
(0.70) 
 -0.149 
(0.19) 
 
Employ. 
Sector 
            
Private 0.014 
(0.47) 
 0.001 
(0.29) 
 0.045 
(0.45) 
 -0.405 
(2.17) 
** 0.021 
(2.45) 
** 2.447 
(2.28) 
** 
Govt. -0.002 
(0.03) 
 0.003 
(1.12) 
 0.040 
(0.11) 
 0.051 
(0.18) 
 0.003 
(0.23) 
 -0.539 
(0.41) 
 
Payment 
Type 
            
Regular 0.028 
(1.00) 
 0.002 
(1.54) 
 -0.073 
(0.56) 
 0.070 
(0.54) 
 0.003 
(0.48) 
 0.311 
(0.46) 
 
Casual 0.012 
(0.38) 
 -0.001 
(0.35) 
 0.198 
(1.85) 
* -0.353 
(1.34) 
 0.019 
(1.64) 
 2.632 
(2.01) 
** 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better.  
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Tables 
 
Table1: Distribution of the Labour Force by Gender (15-60) 
 
Labour Force Status Male Female All 
N % N % N % 
Out of the Labour Force 407 17.7 1559 69.6 1966 43.2 
Unemployed 120 5.2 201 8.9 321 7.1 
Agriculture Self Employed 370 16.1 208 9.2 578 12.7 
Non-Agriculture Self Employed 439 19.1 121 5.4 560 12.3 
Wage Employed 961 42.0 169 7.5 1130 25.0 
All 2297 100 2258 100 4555 100 
 
 
Table2: Completed education levels for males and females (15-60) 
 
Education 
Level 
Description Males Females 
  N % N % 
NO_EDU No education 220 23.0 68 40.2 
LESSPRIM Less than primary – includes ‘kacchi’, ‘pakki’, 
1,2,3 and 4 completed years of schooling 
58 6.0 4 2.4 
PRIMARY Completed 5, 6 or 7 years of schooling 157 16.4 8 4.7 
MIDDLE Completed 8 or 9 years of schooling 159 16.6 7 4.1 
MATRIC Completed 10 or 11 years of schooling 221 23.0 29 17.2 
INTER Completed 12 or 13 years of schooling 78 8.1 19 11.2 
BA_MORE Completed 14 or more years of schooling 67 7.0 34 20.1 
      
ALL  960 100 169 100 
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Table 6: Marginal Effects from Logit of Sectoral Attainment (Higher Order Skills)  -  
dependent variable (=1 if in government sector job, 0 if in private) . Sample of wage employees only. 
 
 
Govt Job 
(1) (2) 
 Males Females 
   
Schooling 0.0468 0.0973 
 (3.47)*** (2.76)*** 
Schooling2 -0.0004 -0.0037 
 (-0.49) (-2.57)** 
Tlit 0.0007 0.0079 
 (0.03) (0.19) 
Tlit2 -0.0020 0.0027 
 (-0.57) (0.50) 
Tmaths -0.0464 -0.0584 
 (-2.44)** (1.41) 
Tmaths2 0.0050 0.0043 
 (3.17)*** (1.36) 
   
N 560 131 
Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better; 
Controls also include Age (yrs) and Head (=1 if individual is household head, 0 otherwise). Raven score 
insignificant and hence dropped. Tlit = total score on literacy test (max = 8), Tlti2 = Tlit squared, Tmaths = total 
score on maths test (max = 12), Tmaths2 = Tmaths squared.  Literacy and numeracy test scores were available 
only for a sub-sample of waged workers, that is why N here is lower than that in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit of Occupational Attainment (Higher Order Skills)   
 (= 0 if Elementary, = 1 if Blue-Collar and = 2 if White-Collar). Sample of wage employees only. 
 
 Male Female 
 
Elementary 
 
Blue- Collar White- Collar Elementary 
 
Blue- Collar White- Collar 
Schooling -0.0336 0.0259 0.0077 -0.3262 0.0722 0.2540 
 (-1.58) (1.22) (1.05) (-2.04)** (1.66)* (1.43) 
Schooling2 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0170 -0.0067 -0.0103 
 (0.28) (-0.15) (-1.44) (2.83)*** (-2.04)** (-1.40) 
Tlit -0.0160 0.0162 -0.0002 0.0814 -0.0178 -0.0636 
 (-0.39) (0.39) (-0.09) (0.54) (-0.20) (-0.71) 
Tlit2 0.0022 -0.0024 0.0001 -0.0077 -0.0003 0.0080 
 (0.41) (-0.43) (0.33) (-0.37) (-0.02) (0.78) 
Tmaths 0.0152 -0.0120 -0.0032 -0.0086 -0.1124 0.1209 
 (0.54) (-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.07) (-1.91)* (1.25) 
Tmaths2 -0.0035 0.0031 0.0003 -0.0041 0.0138 -0.0097 
 (-1.31) (1.19) (0.61) (-0.32) (1.78)* (-1.23) 
N 542 131 
Notes:  As in Table 6. 
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Table 8: Earnings Functions – Various Specifications 
 
Log earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Male Female 
Male 0.581 0.622     
 (6.11)*** (6.35)***     
Schooling 0.051 0.015 0.045 0.009 0.083 0.049 
 (9.06)*** (0.94) (8.52)*** (0.64) (5.27)*** (0.87) 
Schooling2  0.003  0.003  0.002 
  (2.35)**  (2.49)**  (0.65) 
Exp 0.078 0.077 0.061 0.059 0.205 0.205 
 (10.45)*** (10.30)*** (9.27)*** (9.01)*** (6.21)*** (6.12)*** 
Exp2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
 (8.47)*** (8.46)*** (7.37)**8 (7.27)*** (4.87)*** (4.77)*** 
Constant 6.975 7.003 7.702 7.770 6.188 6.217 
 (55.88)*** (56.37)*** (123.53)*** (120.01)*** (22.37)*** (22.11)*** 
Observations 686 686 559 559 127 127 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.34 0.34 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better 
 
 
 
Table 9: Earnings Functions, by gender (with Basic Order Skills) 
 
Log earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Male Female 
Male 0.590 0.613 -  -  
 (6.09)*** (6.27)***     
Schooling 0.055 -0.025 0.052 -0.008 0.057 -0.295 
 (6.01)*** (-0.98) (6.05)*** (0.38) (1.34) (2.07)** 
Schooling2  0.004  0.004  0.016 
  (3.09)***  (2.71)***  (2.75)*** 
Exp 0.078 0.077 0.061 0.059 0.206 0.201 
 (10.43)*** (10.23)*** (9.25)*** (8.94)*** (6.26)*** (6.08)*** 
Exp2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-8.50)*** (-8.23)*** (7.41)*** (7.15)*** (4.91)*** (4.66)*** 
Literate -0.054 0.226 -0.103 0.098 0.347 2.047 
 (-0.56) (1.96)** (1.22) (1.04) (0.64) (2.38)** 
Constant 6.981 7.000 7.729 7.763 6.162 6.229 
 (55.75)*** (56.51)*** (121.71)*** (119.51)*** (22.32)*** (22.62)*** 
N 686 686 559 559 127 127 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.34 0.37 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 10: Earnings Functions, by Gender and Region 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log earnings Male Female Male Female 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Schooling 0.056 0.047 -0.009 0.195 0.008 -0.038 -0.329 0.272 
 (4.99)*** (3.41)*** (0.15) (4.42)*** (0.31) (0.99) (2.38)** (1.09) 
Schooling2     0.003 0.005 0.016 -0.003 
     (1.64) (2.42)** (2.37)** (0.30) 
Literate -0.121 -0.168 1.182 -1.478 0.036 0.108 2.604 -1.900 
 (1.16) (1.14) (1.79)* (2.01)** (0.34) (0.58) (3.33)*** (1.37) 
Observations 391 168 78 49 391 168 78 49 
R-squared 0.20 0.27 0.37 0.45 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.45 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better; 
Controls for Experience and its square included but not shown.  
 
 
Table 11 – Effects of Socialisation Skills and Personality traits (when aged 15) on log earnings in 
adulthood 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log earnings 
Regression 
coefficient not 
conditioning on 
SCHOOLING and 
LITERATE 
Regression 
coefficient 
conditioning on 
SCHOOLING  
Regression 
coefficient 
conditioning on 
LITERATE 
Regression 
coefficient 
conditioning on 
SCHOOLING and 
LITERATE 
Male 0.569 0.592 0.495 0.581 
 (5.62)*** (6.18)*** (5.14)*** (5.90)*** 
Exp 0.075 0.079 0.079 0.080 
 (9.57)*** (10.47)*** (10.12)*** (10.50)*** 
Exp2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (8.22)*** (8.52)*** (8.19)*** (8.55)*** 
Postrait 0.061 0.013 0.016 0.002 
 (2.39)** (0.54) (0.65) (0.09) 
Negtrait 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) 
Religious 0.101 0.033 0.035 0.013 
 (1.77)* (0.59) (0.61) (0.24) 
Schooling - 0.048 - 0.054 
  (7.96)***  (5.72)*** 
Literate - - 0.436 -0.048 
   (6.80)*** (0.50) 
Constant 7.183 6.948 7.023 6.973 
 (53.38)*** (51.37)*** (50.68)*** (50.52)*** 
Observations 700 700 675 675 
R-squared 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.29 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better; 
Postrait (positive personality traits) = made friends easily (equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise) + had a lot to say 
(equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise) + made plans and stuck to them (equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise) + accepted people as 
they were (equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise); Negtrait (negative personality traits) = found it difficult to get down to 
work equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise) + did just enough work to get by (equals 1 if did, 0 otherwise); Religious = 1 
if was sympathetic to religious parties/causes, 0 otherwise.  
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Table 12A: OLS and Instrumental Variable Estimates of Log Earnings (All, i.e. Male and Female) 
 
 All 
Log earnings OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
First Stage 
(3) 
     Schooling Literate 
Schooling 0.056 
(6.03) 
*** 0.023 
(0.32) 
 -  -  
Literate -0.047 
(-0.49) 
 0.503 
(0.53) 
 -  -  
Male  0.590 
(5.99) 
*** 0.504 
(2.79) 
*** -0.217 
(-0.52) 
 0.132 
(3.57) 
*** 
Exp 0.078 
(10.21) 
*** 0.079 
(9.90) 
*** 0.004 
(0.09) 
 -0.001 
(-0.32) 
 
Exp2 -0.002 
(-8.36) 
*** -0.002 
(-7.55) 
*** -0.002 
(-1.47) 
 -0.000 
(-1.89) 
* 
Pdist*1000 -  -  -0.511 
(-4.01) 
*** -0.037 
(-2.90) 
*** 
Pdist2*1000 -  -  0.000 
(1.87) 
* 0.000 
(1.37) 
 
Fedu -  -  0.460 
(11.07) 
*** 0.036 
(10.63) 
*** 
Medu -  -  0.214 
(2.85) 
*** 0.003 
(0.60) 
 
Ravens -  -  0.580 
(10.41) 
*** 0.043 
(8.68) 
*** 
Constant  6.980 
(54.84) 
*** 6.851 
(41.12) 
 1.375 
(1.93) 
* 0.218 
(3.35) 
*** 
         
R2 0.287  0.255  0.439  0.342  
N 667  667  667  667  
P-value (F test of excluded 
instruments) 
-  -  0.000  0.000  
P-value (overid test) -  -  0.900 
 
Note: Robust t statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better; 
Pdist = distance in meters to nearest primary school when individual was of school-going age, Pdist2 = Pdist 
squared, Fedu = Father’s completed education in years, Medu = Mother’s completed education in years, 
Ravens = score on the Ravens test (max = 20). 
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Table 13 – Household Fixed Effect Estimates of Log Earnings (All Individuals Aged 15-60) 
 
 
Log earnings 
All 
 OLS  FE  
Male 0.564 
(4.97) 
*** 0.629 
(3.73) 
*** 
Schooling 0.048 
(3.90) 
*** 0.051 
(1.86) 
* 
Exp 0.069 
(6.89) 
*** 0.079 
(4.32) 
*** 
Exp2 -0.001 
(-5.72) 
*** -0.002 
(-3.49) 
*** 
Literate -0.060 
(-0.43) 
 -0.055 
(-0.25) 
 
Constant  7.141 
(49.70) 
*** 7.023 
(26.47) 
*** 
     
R2 0.245 0.245 
N 401 401 
No. Of Groups - 224 
Notes:  Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% and *** at 1% or better; 
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 Figures 
 
Figure 1 
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Kernel densities of  literacy test scores for Males and Females
 
 
Note1: Solid line represents males and dotted line represents females; 
Note2: Kernel densities show the distribution of a variable. Thus, a kernel density of literacy test scores shows 
the distribution of that score.  The height of the distribution shows the frequency of individuals receiving a given 
score.  The area under the distribution totals to 1. Thus, we can see that among males the highest frequency 
(compared to females) scored 0 on the test while roughly the same frequency of males and females scored 
between 2 and 8 points on the test.   
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Figure 2 
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Note 1: Cognitive skills score is the sum of total literacy score (max score achievable was 13) and total 
numeracy score (max score achievable was 13). The maximum score attainable on the ravens test was 20.  
 
Figure 3: Males- Estimated Probability of Occupation and Education 
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Figure 4: Females - Estimated Probability of Occupation and Education 
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Note: Figures 3 and 4 are based on multinomial logits reported in Table 4B. 
 
